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ABSTRACT: Enmeshed with Agamben’s critique of metaphysics is his critique of 
deconstruction. Following the sentiment he first outlined in Language and Death: The Place of 
Negativity (1982), deconstruction’s alleged attempt to displace the privileging of speech with that 
of writing to thereby dispel the negativity at the core of Western metaphysics, to the contrary 
has the effect of reifying this problem by expressing its terms most perfectly. Agamben takes 
this criticism further in the Homo Sacer series by suggesting that not only does deconstruction 
reiterate the problem of metaphysics, it mimics the conditions of the state of exception as rule 
in the temporal suspension of its infinite deferral of signification. As a counter to 
deconstruction’s “thwarted messianism,” in The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to 
the Romans (2001), Agamben posits a messianic time immanent to every instant, likening it to 
both the speech act and the very structure of thought itself. Implicit in this critique is an 
ongoing concern with temporality and presence that resonates across his corpus, and has grave 
consequences for his professed fidelity to Walter Benjamin. 
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In his essay “Giorgio Agamben’s Franciscan Ontology,” Lorenzo Chiesa argues that 
implicit to Agamben’s philosophy of the coming politics is a transformation of the 
figure of bare life that corresponds to metaphysical nihilism into the positive figure of 
the contemporary homo sacer. This transformation, which may subvert “the form in 
which the relation between bare life and political existence has been so far thought 
and lived in the West,”1 must occur as a consequence of an emancipatory messianic 
event. Chiesa, therefore, determines Agamben’s biopolitics to be a bio-theo-politics. 
1 Lorenzo Chiesa, ‘Giorgio Agamben’s Franciscan Ontology’, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and 
Social Philosophy, vol. 5, no. 1, 2009, p. 108. 
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Two significant moves are at work here. Firstly, there is a division of bare life into 
negative and positive polarities organized as a sequence—either through the capture 
of homo sacer in the sovereign ban or the liberation of bare life through its undoing of 
the binding of life and law. The second is the consequent conclusion that Agamben’s 
formulation of messianic time as kairological rather than chronological does not 
entirely succeed in that the relation between the two figures is an evental one, in 
which messianic nihilism confronts imperfect nihilism in a vital inversion of their 
sequence, this event arguably corresponding to the resurrection of Christ. 
While Chiesa’s foremost point of contention here is this latent Christianity, which, 
following Agamben’s own suggestion in The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the 
Letter to the Romans (2001) and further attested to by more recent publications such as 
The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life (2011), he labels as Franciscan,2 his 
challenge to the validity of messianic time is significant. For temporality is crucial in 
the linguistic undercurrents of Agamben’s ontology and, indeed, his philosophy in 
general. However, Chiesa’s re-inscription of messianic time into chronological time 
through the messianic event runs the risk of losing sight of Agamben’s own re-
inscription of messianic time into the chronological instant with his Benveniste-
inflected conception of language. Time does mark the distinction between the 
annihilative and the emancipatory in Agamben’s thought; but, beyond the time of the 
messianic event, Christian or not, is a more complex construction of the evental time 
of enunciation that is bound up with negativity and presence. 
The structure of this linguistic temporality is evident in Agamben’s ongoing 
critique of deconstruction, which he describes in Time That Remains as a “thwarted 
messianism,”3 in which can be discerned the far-reaching consequences of this 
ontological structure that underpins his philosophy. Agamben’s contentious 
relationship with Derrida begins in the margins of his text Stanzas (1977),4 but we shall 
begin here with his interweaving of deconstruction with the sovereign ban and the 
2 See also Agamben’s discussion of the Franciscans in the chapter ‘In Praise of Profanation’ in Giorgio 
Agamben, Profanations, trans. Jeff Fort, Cambridge, MA and London, MIT Press, 2007, pp. 82-83. The 
Christian tendency in Agamben’s work has been interpreted to varying effect. Jeffrey Librett has 
commented on Agamben’s latent Christianity in the context of an anti-nomial anti-Semitism whereas 
Colby Dickinson has recently argued that it founds a divine materialism beyond the human/animal 
division. See Colby Dickinson, ‘Beyond Objects, Beyond Subjects: Giorgio Agamben on Animality, 
Particularity and the End of Onto-theology’, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, 
vol. 7, no. 1, 2011, pp. 87-103; Jeffrey S. Librett, ‘From the Sacrifice of the Letter to the Voice of 
Testimony: Giorgio Agamben’s Fulfillment of Metaphysics’, Diacritics 37, no. 2/3, Fall, 2007, pp. 11-33. 
3 Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. Patricia Dailey, 
Stanford, Stanford University Press, p. 103. 
4 See Kevin Attell for a discussion of the Saussurian dimension of this critique. Kevin Attell, ‘An Esoteric 
Dossier: Agamben and Derrida Read Saussure’, ELH 76, no. 4, Winter, 2009, pp. 821-846. 
                                                          
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 185 
state of exception as articulated in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1995), the 
text that is also Chiesa’s starting point for his critique of Agamben’s Franciscan 
ontology. 
Drawing upon a series of personal letters exchanged between Gershom Scholem 
and Walter Benjamin regarding his essay on Franz Kafka published in 1934,5 
Agamben takes up Scholem’s formulation of “the nothing of revelation” as the 
expression of language’s sovereign command over humanity. Originally an idea 
advanced in Scholem’s poetic commentary upon Kafka’s The Trial (1925), Agamben 
asserts that the nothing of revelation describes the status of the law that does not 
signify anything yet remains in force. The law in this case is not absent, but appears in 
the form of unrealizability, in Agamben’s words, as a being in force without significance. 
While Scholem doubts the prospect of a revelation that continues to appear as such, 
even reduced to the zero point of its own content such that it can no longer be 
fulfilled,6 Agamben states that “nothing better describes the ban that our age cannot 
master,”7 and rehabilitates Scholem’s concept of the “nothingness of revelation” as a 
being in force without significance to support his critique of deconstruction. He writes,  
The experience of being in force without significance lies at the basis of a 
current of contemporary thought that is not irrelevant here. The prestige of 
deconstruction in our time lies precisely in its having conceived of the entire text 
of tradition as being in force without significance, a being in force whose 
strength lies essentially in its undecidability and in having shown that such a 
being in force is, like the door of the Law in Kafka’s parable, absolutely 
impassable.8 
This consignment of deconstruction to the nihilistic apex of the Western 
metaphysical tradition very much follows his accusation fifteen years earlier in 
Language and Death: The Place of Negativity (1982) of Derrida’s thought simply reiterating 
the fundamental metaphysical problem of an originary temporality that it claims to 
surpass. This problem is expressed in terms of a self-reflexive will to signify that is 
5 See Gershom Scholem, The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem: 1932-1940, trans. Gary 
Smith and Andre Lefevere, New York, Schocken Books, 1989, pp. 119-145, 220-226; and Walter 
Benjamin, ‘Franz Kafka: On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death’ and ‘Some Reflections on Kafka’ in 
Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn, New York, Schocken Books, 
1968, pp. 111-140 and 141-145. 
6 Scholem, Correspondence, p. 142. 
7 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, Stanford, CA, 
Stanford University Press, 1998, p. 51. 
8 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 54. This is a notion that he will later peculiarly liken to the thought of Schmitt; 
see Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell, Chicago and London, University of Chicago 
Press, 2003, p. 64. 
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manifest in the transition from the “sonorous flux emitted by the phonic apparatus” to 
a Voice that “articulates the split between signification and demonstration constitutive 
of the originary structure of transcendence.”9 As an animal cry, the human voice may 
be the agent of sound and can even refer to the individual making it, but it requires 
the will to signify—the Voice—for the event of language itself to take place, the absolute 
present of the deictic instant in which the enunciative act refers only to itself.10 In the 
Voice, the indecipherable babble of the animal voice must thus be effaced as meaning 
occurs in the passage from signification to indication, the purely self-reflexive taking 
place of language. In the violent and self-perpetuating will-to-signify of the Voice, which 
is thus ultimately a will-to-will-to-signify, is manifest the quest of metaphysics to secure a 
link between nature and culture as the “pure temporality” of the arthron that 
“articulates voice and language and thus discloses being and meaning,” a removal 
that is also a preservation.11 
Key to this formulation is the influence of linguist Émile Benveniste upon 
Agamben’s thought as it pertains to temporality and enunciation. Following his 
elaboration of Benveniste’s theory of the double signification of language as the split 
between language and discourse indicated by our infantile will to speech in Infancy and 
History: The Destruction of Experience (1978),12 Agamben again cites Benveniste to 
substantiate his argument on the fundamental negativity of language as exemplary of 
the metaphysical problem. Arguing that temporality itself is generated in and through 
the enunciative act, he quotes the linguist: 
The formal present does nothing else but explicate the present inherent in the 
utterance [énonciation], which is renewed with each production of discourse, and 
which, beginning with this present that is continuous and coexistent with our 
own presence, engraves in consciousness the feeling of a continuity that we call 
‘time’; continuity and temporality that are generated in this incessant present of 
the utterance, that is the present of being itself, and they are delimited through 
9 Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death: The Place of Negativity, trans. Karen E. Pinkus with Michael Hardt, 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1991, pp. 35-36. 
10 Agamben cites the pronoun, which is itself inherently meaningless except when in actual use in linguistic 
demonstration, as paradigmatic of this self-reflexive function. That is, the pronoun is actuated in the 
specific instance of discourse when the glyph I comes to signify my flesh and blood, thereby illuminating 
apart from any actual signification the very power of language to signify. See Agamben, Language and 
Death, 19-26. 
11 Agamben, Language and Death, pp. 39, 85. Agamben hyper-extends this formula to implicate not only 
philosophy, but “every science.” See Agamben, Language and Death, 18. 
12 Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: The Destruction of Experience, trans. Liz Heron, London and New 
York, Verso, 1993, pp. 63-64. This division founds the concept of infancy as the linguistic experience of 
man that renders him an historic being. 
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an internal reference between what will become present and what is no longer 
present.13 
As the domain of the Voice in the taking place of language, Agamben reads this 
illusory “incessant present of the utterance” as the negative ground of time and being 
in the Western metaphysical tradition.14 Following his reading of Benveniste, the 
specificity produced by the Voice in the event of language demands an absolute 
temporal present, but this incessant present is only ever an artifice, a synthetic 
continuity that, with the violent foundational gesture of the exclusion of the animal 
voice, grounds itself in—and is thus wholly dependent upon—a universal and pure 
negativity. 
Given the all-pervasive nature of the structure of the Voice which philosophy itself 
is not equipped to think through, the problem of negativity is not so easy to rid 
ourselves of. As Agamben states, “Metaphysics is the thought and will of being, that is, 
the thought and will of the Voice (or thought and will of death); but this ‘thought’ and 
this ‘will’ must necessarily remain unthematized, because they can only be thematized 
in terms of the most extreme negativity.”15 While the arthron’s false conjoining of 
nature and culture in the articulative event of language only reifies the problem, so 
too does displacing the primacy of speech with writing. Addressing Derrida’s citation 
of Aristotle in the first pages of Of Grammatology (1967), Agamben quotes at greater 
length the same passage of  De Interpretatione, which ascribes symbolic inscription to the 
voice, to assert that the negativity of the Voice is not situated in opposition to the 
gramma, but is rather identical to it: “That which is in the voice (ta en te phone) contains 
the symbols of mental experience, and written words are the symbols of that which is 
in the voice. Just as all men do not have the same writing (grammata), so all men do not 
have the same voices (phonai), but the mental experiences, which these directly 
symbolize, are the same for us all, as also are those things of which our experiences 
(pragmata) are the images.”16 Accordingly, Agamben argues that like the voice, the 
gramma itself not only functions as an “interpreter;” but, it furthermore underpins the 
voice by assuring the order of comprehensibility. Consequently, any attempt to 
13 Agamben, Language and Death, p. 36; quote source: Émile Benveniste, ‘L'appareil formel de 
l'énonciation’, in Problems de linguistique générale, II, Paris, Gallimard, 1974, p. 83. 
14 Agamben, Language and Death, pp. 35-36. 
15 Agamben, Language and Death, p. 88. 
16 Agamben, Language and Death, p. 38; quote source: Aristotle De Interpretatione 1.16a3-7. See Jacques 
Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997, p. 11. 
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surpass metaphysics by removing the privilege given to the voice has no impact in 
diminishing its fundamentally negative structure that is shared with the gramma.17 
Relating both the trace and différance to the Voice that displaces the voice, in 
Language and Death Agamben asserts, 
For metaphysics is not simply the primacy of the voice over the gramma. If 
metaphysics is that reflection that places the voice as origin, it is also true that 
this voice is, from the beginning, conceived as removed, as Voice. To identify 
the horizon of metaphysics simply in that supremacy of the phone and then to 
believe it in one’s power to overcome this horizon through the gramma, is to 
conceive of metaphysics without its coexistent negativity. Metaphysics is always 
already grammatology and this is fundamentology in the sense that the gramma (or 
the Voice) functions as the negative ontological foundation.18 
By assimilating the gramma of writing to the speech of the Voice, Agamben reduces 
deconstruction to a mere repetition of the fundamental metaphysical problem. 
Implicit here is Derrida’s failure to recognize the true temporal constitution of 
metaphysics, and this blind-spot produces what Agamben views as the shortcoming of 
Derrida’s trace, that is, a lack of recognition of its “structure of purely negative self-
affection” that it shares with the Western metaphysical tradition. 
In Homo Sacer, Agamben employs the terminology of Language and Death to levy an 
equally pithy but considerably more damning charge, casting deconstruction as the 
“linguistic state of exception.” Addressing the structure of sovereign power present in 
language, he states: 
the fact that a word always has more sense than it can actually denote 
corresponds to the theorem of the point of excess. Precisely this disjunction is at 
issue both in Claude Lévi-Strauss’s theory of the constitutive excess of the 
signifier over the signified . . . and in Émile Benveniste’s doctrine of the 
irreducible opposition between the semiotic and the semantic. The thought of 
our time finds itself confronted with the structure of the exception in every area. 
Language’s sovereign claim thus consists in an attempt to make sense coincide 
with denotation, to stabilize a zone of indistinction between the two in which 
language can maintain itself in relation to its denotata by abandoning them and 
withdrawing from them into a pure langue (the linguistic “state of exception”). 
17 Agamben, Language and Death, p. 38-39. See also Agamben’s discussion of the gramma in his 1984 essay 
dedicated to Derrida, “The Thing Itself,” in Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, 
ed. and trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999, pp. 36-38. 
18 Agamben, Language and Death, p. 39. 
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This is what deconstruction does, positing undecidables that are infinitely in 
excess of every possibility of signification.19  
Beyond the thought of an irreducible excess, time features largely here. The 
“linguistic state of exception” is not simply langue or the semiotic, but the “zone of 
indistinction” in which sense, or the semiotic field of the word, coincides with 
denotation, its deployment in the semantic act of parole. 
The sovereign claim of language and deconstruction is thus to stabilize this zone of 
indistinction. Deconstruction maintains the condition of the linguistic state of exception 
producing an exception-as-rule in its infinite deferral of signification. Given Agamben 
subsumes the gramma into the Voice as indicated in Language and Death, this amounts, 
again, to a distension of the temporality of enunciation in a permanent decision such 
that to speak is to speak always the law. 
Foregoing any further engagement with the question of time, Agamben proceeds 
to distinguish his position from that of deconstruction through his reading of the 
exchange between Scholem and Benjamin in which, he argues, two different 
interpretations of the state of exception in which law begins to coincide with life 
confront each other—one virtual and one real.20 The first, Scholem’s interpretation, 
that would let law subsist as a pure form, the being in force without significance that holds 
bare life in an inclusive exclusion, is to be considered a virtual state of exception. 
Conversely, Benjamin’s state of exception “proposes a messianic nihilism that nullifies 
even the Nothing [of revelation] and lets no form of law remain in force beyond its 
own content.”21 Not only does Agamben suggest that this difference that he draws 
between the thought of Scholem and Benjamin represents the distinction between 
Derrida’s deconstruction and his own thinking,22 he further claims for this distinction 
the means by which to interpret Benjamin’s eighth thesis on the philosophy of history. 
It is inversion, and not time, that Agamben cites as the principal marker between 
these two conditions, resisting any qualitative distinction and favouring instead a 
difference in implementation.  Noting Benjamin’s sentiment that much of Kafka’s 
work involves an attempt to transform life into scripture, Agamben writes, 
19 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 25. 
20 Agamben, Homo Sacer, pp. 53, 55. 
21 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 53. 
22 Simon Morgan Wortham has also noted this Derrida/Scholem - Agamben/Benjamin alignment 
present in Homo Sacer in his essay “The Law of Friendship: Agamben and Derrida,” though he 
purposefully resists the “hugely daunting task” of excavating the origins of Agamben’s critique of 
deconstruction. See Simon Morgan Wortham, “The Law of Friendship: Agamben and Derrida,” New 
Formations, vol. 62, 2007, p. 99. 
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Law that becomes indistinguishable from life in a real state of exception is 
confronted by life that, in a symmetrical but inverse gesture, is entirely 
transformed into law. The absolute intelligibility of a life wholly resolved into 
writing corresponds to the impenetrability of a writing that, having become 
indecipherable, now appears as life. Only at this point do the two terms 
distinguished and kept united by the relation of the ban (bare life and the form 
of law) abolish each other and enter into a new dimension.23 
Minimizing the fact that in the Kafka essay and in his letters to Scholem, Benjamin 
regards this attempt as a failure,24 there is instead the suggestion that one may seize 
the very conditions of oppression, the coincidence of life and law, and transform it 
from the pure force of law without significance of which deconstruction is 
emblematic, into the active writing of one’s life, transforming one’s life into law. In 
this sense, Chiesa’s argument is particularly salient. 
Agamben draws from Martin Heidegger to elaborate the achievement of this 
“new dimension” in which there is no longer any relation as such between life and 
law, by pushing the experience of abandonment to its extreme, inverting the nihilism 
of being in force without significance to liberate abandonment from “every idea of law and 
destiny.”25 The sentiment of overturning nihilism by dwelling in the experience of its 
absolute limit recalls the Means Without End essays, both “Marginal Notes on 
Commentaries on the Society of the Spectacle” (1990) when we are advised that only those 
who will be able to carry to completion the devastating experimentum linguae of the 
society of the spectacle that empties traditions, beliefs, identities, communities, and so 
forth, by bringing language itself to language will become “the first citizens of a 
community with neither presuppositions nor a state,”26 and “Notes on Politics” (1992) 
in which human society must “see its own impotence through to the end” to “break 
everywhere the nexus between violence and right, between the living and language 
that constitutes sovereignty,” and to appropriate our own historicity, opening the field 
to “nonstatal and nonjuridical politics and human life” that remains to be thought,27 as 
well as Agamben’s early messianic readings of Nietzsche’s eternal return.28 What this 
23 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 55. 
24 While Agamben notes that the parable is generally read as an account of failure, he resists 
acknowledging that Benjamin reads Kafka’s gesture itself as a failure. 
25 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 60. 
26 Giorgio Agamben, ‘Marginal Notes on Commentaries on the Society of the Spectacle’, in Means Without End: 
Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino, Minneapolis and London, University of 
Minnesota Press, 2000, p. 85. 
27 Giorgio Agamben, ‘Notes on Politics’, in Means Without End, pp. 112-113. 
28 See Giorgio Agamben, The Man Without Content, trans. Georgia Albert, Stanford, Stanford University 
Press, 1999, pp. 85-93. 
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amounts to is not a disruption of the sustained present of the state of exception as rule 
but rather a seizing of it that inverts the position of power and obliterates its own 
conditions in the process. 
Returning to his critique of deconstruction, this passage must be read in tandem 
with Agamben’s presentation of Kafka’s parable “Before the Law” that is embedded 
in The Trial (1925). The story tells of a man from the country that stands before the 
open gates of the law, only to be refused entry by the gatekeeper who suggests he may 
be granted permission to enter at some point in the future though beyond this gate he 
will face innumerable more. The man spends the duration of his life before the open 
doors, until the brink of his death when in response to his question of why he is the 
only person seeking entry, the gatekeeper proclaims that the doors were meant only 
for him and he will now be closing them. Quoting Derrida’s reading of the parable as 
an “event that succeeds in not happening,” Agamben inverts the tale himself, instead 
proposing the opposite, that the story tells how “something has really happened in 
seeming not to happen.”29 He thus transforms the parable from the failure of the man 
from the country to enter the doors to his success in having them closed. While 
deconstruction preserves the force of the law that does not signify, allowing the doors 
to remain open and the virtual state of exception to persist, Agamben asserts that our 
task to make the virtual state of exception real is to end the being in force without 
significance by provoking the gatekeeper to close the doors of the Law.30 
How does this exegesis of Kafka’s parable translate back into the linguistic 
terminology that Agamben employs in his primary critique of deconstruction? If 
deconstruction describes the sovereign ban of the linguistic state of exception in the 
forced permanent coincidence of sense and denotation, “positing undecidables that are 
infinitely in excess of every possibility of signification,”31 then closing the doors of the 
law, ending the being in force without significance, may quite feasibly be understood to be, 
not the inversion of repurposing the coincidence of life and law that Agamben 
suggests in regard to the “virtual” and “real” states of exception, but simply 
signification. 
29 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 57; quote source: Jacques Derrida, ‘Préjugés’ in Norbert Bolz and Wolfgang 
Hübener (eds.), Spiegel und Gleichnis: Festschrift für Jacob Taubes, Würzburg, Königshausen and Neumann, 
1983, p. 359. 
30 This is quite a departure from his earlier characterization of the porous inclusive-exclusive threshold of 
the “Outside” of The Coming Community (1990), in which the threshold as “the experience of the limit itself, 
the experience of a being-within an outside,” is the “gift that singularity gathers from the empty hands of 
humanity.” See Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt, Minneapolis, University 
of Minnesota Press, 2005, p. 68. 
31 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 25. 
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What we are confronted with in deconstruction is the continuity of this originary 
negative temporality of the utterance through the infinite deferral of signification, a 
temporality that Agamben will later insist is fugitive in Remnants of Auschwitz: The 
Witness and the Archive (1998). In Language and Death, Agamben writes of the Voice that, 
as a no-longer (sound) and a not-yet (meaning), necessarily constitutes a negative 
dimension. He continues, 
According to a tradition that dominates all Western reflection on language from 
the Ancient grammarians’ notion of gramma to the phoneme in modern 
phonology, that which articulates the human voice in language is a pure 
negativity. 
    In fact, the Voice discloses the place of language, but in such a way that this 
place is always already captured in negativity, and above all, always already 
consigned to temporality. Inasmuch as it takes place in the Voice (that is, in the nonplace 
of the voice, in its having-been), language takes place in time. In demonstrating the instance of 
discourse, the Voice discloses both being and time. It is chronothetic.32 
It is Benveniste’s exposition of enunciation to which Agamben attributes an “excellent 
analysis” of this condition in which one can discern the beginnings of the spatio-
temporal entity of the state of exception. Deconstruction, as he claims a few pages 
later, as the Voice, therefore, bears this same condition of the pure negativity of 
articulation, the “incessant present of the instance of discourse.”33 
Notably, Agamben modifies his reading of Benveniste’s concept in Remnants of 
Auschwitz, but this modification serves to strengthen rather than diminish his critique 
of deconstruction. Having previously determined the utterance to indicate a 
continuous present grounded in a groundless negativity, in Remnants of Auschwitz this 
negativity is treated in a more literal sense as regards the actual enunciative act. 
Referring to Benveniste’s programme for a post-Saussurian semantics of enunciation, 
he writes, 
“I” is neither a notion nor a substance, and enunciation grasps not what is said 
in discourse but the pure fact of its being said, the event—by definition 
fugitive—of language as such. Like the philosophers’ concept of Being, 
enunciation is together what is most unique and concrete since it refers to the 
absolutely singular and unrepeatable instance of active discourse, and it is what 
is most vacuous and generic since it is repeated every time without ever being 
possible to fix its lexical realty.34  
32 Agamben, Language and Death, p. 35. 
33 Agamben, Language and Death, p. 38-40. 
34 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 138; translation modified. 
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Now acknowledging the ephemerality of enunciation, the claim that deconstruction 
prolongs indefinitely the coincidence of what are here described as the most concrete 
and the most generic facets of language—denotation and sense—becomes less a 
question of inversion and more clearly a matter of time, the conflation of exception 
and rule. 
At issue here is that the condition of the linguistic state of exception is that in 
which langue and parole, sense and denotation, like exception and rule, coincide 
indefinitely. Following Agamben’s own logic, this linguistic state of exception to which 
the history of metaphysics has inevitably moved toward with deconstruction at its 
zenith, would operate as a distension of the fugitive temporality of the enunciative act. 
Nevertheless, that language takes place and meaningful discourse is exchanged among 
human beings indicates, at least implicitly, a proper functioning of the state of 
exception, or perhaps better stated, a functioning of the rule/exception binary that, 
confined within the temporal boundaries of enunciation, equates communication. 
Irrespective of whether or not one accepts Agamben’s contention that Carl Schmitt’s 
formula of the exception merely codifies the historical inevitability of the subsumption 
of exception into rule, structurally speaking, as the taking place of language that 
conforms to the temporal order of the utterance, exception-as-rule may yet exist as 
rule/exception, unsettling the very premise of Homo Sacer indicated by Agamben’s 
teleological construction of Western metaphysics manifest in law, politics, and the 
state. 
Just prior to Agamben’s charge of deconstruction’s stabilization of the zone of 
indistinction between sense and denotation, speaking of Badiou’s theory of the event 
likening sense to inclusion and denotation to belonging (appartenance), the author 
concedes that in this case the exception expresses the “impossibility of a system’s 
making inclusion coincide with membership, its reducing all its parts to unity.”35 
Here, we encounter the two models of the taking place of language set forth in 
Language and Death (1982) previously and to come in Remnants of Auschwitz (1998). The 
taking place of language as the arthron or articulation that spans the originary 
metaphysical scission is, as averred in Language and Death, an absolute and continuous 
negativity, the true foundation of deconstruction, whether or not deconstruction is 
aware of this. The taking place of language in Remnants of Auschwitz, conversely, marks 
the irreducible disjunction between knowing and saying, vital functions and inner 
history, “between the living being’s becoming a speaking being and the speaking 
35 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 25. See Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham, paperback ed., 
London and New York, Continuum, 2007, pp. 81-92. Feltham’s translation of appartenance as ‘belonging’ 
differs from that of Heller-Roazen. 
                                                          
 JENNY DOUSSAN 194 
being’s sensation of itself as a living being,”36 the intimacy that founds subjectivity in 
the fugitive instant, quite like the description Agamben here gives of the event as an 
impossibility of the coincidence of belonging and inclusion rather than the 
coincidence of sense and denotation. 
In Remnants of Auschwitz as in Homo Sacer, Agamben isolates a precise point at 
which his philosophy differs critically from that of Derrida. While Derrida’s thought 
acknowledges an originary disjunction in the I and finds there the infinite deferral of 
writing “inscribed in the pure self-presence of consciousness,”37 Agamben rejects the 
unity that he understands this deferral to imply. He writes, 
It is in this non-place of articulation that deconstruction inscribes its “trace” and 
its différance, in which voice and letter, meaning and presence are infinitely 
differed. The line that, in Kant, marked the only possible way to 
represent the auto-affection of time is now the movement of a writing on 
which “the ‘look’ cannot ‘abide.’” But precisely this impossibility of 
conjoining the living being and language, phǀnē and logos, the inhuman 
and the human—far from authorizing the infinite deferral of 
signification—is what allows for testimony. . . . The intimacy that betrays 
our non-coincidence with ourselves is the place of testimony. Testimony 
takes place in the non-place of articulation. In the non-place of the Voice stands 
not writing, but the witness.38 
Agamben argues that it is the authentic constitution of subjectivity as the structure of 
shame—the temporality of auto-affection in which the subject is “reciprocally 
consigned to something that cannot be assumed”—that begets testimony, the concept 
that he advances to dislodge the persistent claims of articulation made by Western 
metaphysics. Interestingly, whereas writing in Benjamin as the transformation of life 
into scripture39 is read by Agamben in Homo Sacer to effect the messianic inversion of 
the virtual state of exception, it here gives way to testimony, an expression of the 
heterogeneous temporality of enunciation. With an equally acerbic inflection, 
Agamben accuses deconstruction here, as in Language and Death in which the gramma is 
36 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, New 
York, Zone Books, 1999, p. 125; see also p. 112. 
37 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 123. 
38 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 129-130. Agamben here quotes Derrida’s critique of Husserl in 
Speech and Phenomena (1967). See Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of 
Signs, trans. David B. Allison, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1973, p. 104. 
39 Agamben, Homo Sacer, pp. 54-55. 
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consigned to articulation, of a blindness to the consideration of time, perpetuating in an 
infinite deferral the “pure temporality” of “purely negative self-affection.”40 
Instead, what occurs in this disjunction that allows for testimony, as can be 
discerned throughout Remnants of Auschwitz, is nothing more than the irreducible 
heterogeneity of time. Commenting upon a passage in the novel La Notte (1996) by 
Giorgio Manganelli, Agamben writes, “In the process of vertiginous, heteronymic 
subjectification, it is as if something always survived, as if an ulterior or residual ‘I’ 
were generated in each uttered ‘I,’ such that its elevation to a squared pseudonymity 
were never truly completed, always falling back onto a new ‘I,’ indiscernible from the 
first but not coinciding with it.”41 Though Agamben ascribes the concept of the 
remnant to this formula, a temporal notion in itself, the words generate and new disclose 
the relationship of signification to a temporal order.42 If deconstruction, in its infinite 
deferral of signification—its sheltering the Nothingness of the open doors of the Law 
in its being in force without significance as articulated in Homo Sacer—disregards and 
distends the heterogeneous structure of time into a uniform prolapse of negativity, 
than one may fairly presume that the generation that occurs in the ipseity of the I of 
testimony both signifies and assumes a correct comportment to time. When Agamben 
writes, “This instance of discourse in the pure present irreparably divides the self-
presence of sensations and experiences in the very moment in which it refers them to 
a unitary center,”43 it is as if he here establishes, perhaps unintentionally, an 
underlying structural complicity between signification and time, as if the taking place 
of language functions as the regular opening and closing of a valve in time, when 
sense and denotation are repulsed at the instant they touch each other.44 
40 Agamben, Language and Death, p. 39. 
41 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 132; translation modified. 
42 We may also refer to Agamben’s own quotation of Benveniste in Language and Death which, though 
initially read to different effect, suggests as much: “The formal present does nothing else but explicate the 
present inherent in the utterance, which is renewed with each production of discourse, and which, beginning with 
this present that is continuous and coexistent with our own presence, engraves in consciousness the feeling 
of a continuity that we call ‘time’; continuity and temporality that are generated in this incessant present 
of the utterance, that is the present of being itself, and they are delimited through an internal reference 
between what will become present and what is no longer present.” Agamben, Language and Death, 36; 
[emphasis added]; quote source: Benveniste, ‘L'appareil formel de l'énonciation’, p. 83. 
43 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 122; translation modified. 
44 In his 1995 lecture on Guy Debord’s films in which Agamben defines man as a “moviegoing animal,” 
he describes the “messianic task of cinema” in similar terms as a single system of two transcendental 
conditions that “can never be separated: repetition, “the zone of undecidability between the real and the 
possible,” and stoppage, “a noncoincidence, a disjunction between sound and meaning.” See Giorgio 
Agamben, ‘Difference and Repetition: On Guy Debord’s Films’, trans. Brian Holmes, in Tom 
McDonough (ed.), Guy Debord and the Situationists International: Texts and Documents, Cambridge, MIT Press, 
2004, pp. 315-318. 
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Returning to messianic time, in contrast to Agamben’s ostensible posture, this 
almost mechanistic facet of the experience of language resurfaces in Time That 
Remains.45 As it pertains to the decomposition of presence specifically, Agamben looks 
to the Pauline conception of parousia as a complement to the remnant. Within the 
messianic moment, parousia describes the presence that the remnant occupies yet is 
simultaneously forever in excess of. As remnant expresses the self-generating 
ungraspable of messianic time, parousia contrarily refers to the very graspability that 
enables it to achieve it plƝroma or fulfilment. The term, a compound of para- and ousia 
(being beside), therefore, indicates the “uni-dual structure” of messianic presence that 
“lies beside itself, since, without ever coinciding with a chronological instant, and 
without ever adding itself onto it, it seizes hold of this instant and brings it forth to 
fulfilment.”46 While the remnant as a structure carries the promise of completion, 
parousia describes the present in which this structure grasps or organizes itself. This is 
not a final redemption and it is not situated as a supplement, but occurs 
simultaneously with the production of a remnant. As Agamben writes in reference to 
Kafka, “The Messiah always already had his time, meaning he simultaneously makes 
time his and brings it to fulfilment.”47 
The question of sequence and simultaneity is a critical one. Though messianic 
time is expressed as a noncoincidence or disjointedness, it does not follow that it is 
internally or even externally structured as consecutive. Messianic time, rather, is not 
linear but typological. Addressing what he believes to be the prevalent 
misunderstanding today about this temporality, Agamben distinguishes it from both 
chronological and eschatological time. Distinct from the prophetic future and the 
apocalyptic end, messianic time puts into question the very possibility of a clear 
division between the current eon and the atemporal eternity to come.48 Messianic 
time is not a distinct era that falls neatly in between chronological time and the 
eschaton, but rather is “part of the secular eon that constitutively exceeds chronos and 
as a part of eternity that exceeds the future eon, while being situated in the position of 
a remainder with regard to the division between the two eons.”49 
45 Leland de la Durantaye, by contrast, identifies a “mechanical” quality of deconstruction underlying 
Agamben’s critique of Derrida without recognizing this very quality, if inadvertent, in Agamben’s own 
work. See Leland de la Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction, Stanford, Stanford University 
Press, 2009, p. 189. 
46 Agamben, Time That Remains, pp. 70-71. 
47 Agamben, Time That Remains, p. 71. In the sense that messianic presence is not to come, but is already 
here, Agamben rather dubiously likens this idea to Benjamin’s notion that each instant may be the door 
through which the messiah enters. 
48 Agamben, Time That Remains, pp. 61-63. 
49 Agamben, Time That Remains, p. 64. 
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It is on this point that Agamben continues his enduring critique of deconstruction. 
Suggesting a correspondence with the thought of Scholem as presented in Homo 
Sacer,50 Agamben distinguishes his own philosophy from that of Derrida by accusing 
him of grounding his thought in a conflation of messianic time with eschatological 
time, amounting to “a life lived in deferment.”51 While Derrida’s trace, summarized by 
Agamben as “the impossibility of a sign to be extinguished in the fullness of a present 
and absolute presence,”52 to some extent recalls the inexhaustible division of the 
remnant that is forever exceeding presence, the trace flattens time, obliterating its 
parousia, and further renders impossible the fulfilment of plƝroma. In what amounts to 
an absence of signification, the trace “must be conceived as ‘before being,’ the thing 
itself, always already a sign and repraesentamen, the signified always already in the 
position of a signifier.”53 He continues, “A signification that signifies only itself can 
never seize hold of itself, it can never catch up with a void in representation, nor does 
it ever allow anything to be an in-significance; rather, it is displaced in one and the 
same and gesture.”54 Thus, with this temporal conflation of past and future, 
deconstruction mimics the suspension of the state of exception in its vacuous 
movement, never signifying but never fully not signifying. As Agamben declares, 
“Deconstruction is a thwarted messianism, a suspension of the messianic,” and this 
state of infinite deferral amounts to a suspension in which the trace “will never come 
to know its own plƝroma.”55 
Given its multidimensional complexity, messianic time properly understood 
nonetheless evades representation. After ineffectually attempting to illustrate the 
situation of this temporality with a timeline, Agamben asserts that the inability to 
represent messianic time spatially is descriptive of its condition. To explain this 
position he takes recourse to an argument made by linguist Gustave Guillaume about 
the cognitive experience of time. He writes, “Every mental operation, however quick, 
has to be achieved in a certain time, which, while short, is no less real.”56 This 
phenomenon, which affects a gap between our experience and conception of a 
50 Agamben, Homo Sacer, pp. 49-54. 
51 Agamben, Time That Remains, pp. 69, 102-103. 
52 Agamben, Time That Remains, pp. 102-103. 
53 Agamben, Time That Remains, p. 103. 
54 Agamben, Time That Remains, p. 103. 
55 Agamben, Time That Remains, p. 103. Compare this to Agamben’s rare discussion of deconstruction that 
is not overtly critical in the 1990 essay “Pardes”, in which he positively attributes to it the self-
referentiality of “a pure word isolated in itself,” with neither voice nor referent, with its semantic value 
indefinitely suspended.” See Giorgio Agamben, “Pardes: The Writing of Potentiality”, in Potentialities, p. 
207. 
56 Agamben, Time That Remains, p. 65. 
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moment, is most readily apparent in our inability to coincide with our image of time. 
Guillaume’s concept of operational time thus constitutes the infinitesimal quantity of 
time that it takes one to complete a representational image of time, “the time it takes the 
mind to realize a time-image.”57 
 Agamben takes operational time as an analogue for messianic time: 
In every representation we make of time and in every discourse by means of 
which we define and represent time, another time is implied that is not entirely 
consumed by representation. It is as though man, insofar as he is a thinking and 
speaking being, produced an additional time with regard to chronological time, 
a time that prevented him from perfectly coinciding with the time out of which 
he could make images and representations. This ulterior time, nevertheless, is 
not another time, it is not a supplementary time added on from outside of 
chronological time. Rather it is something like a time within time—not ulterior 
but interior—which only measures my disconnection with regard to it, my being 
out of synch and in noncoincidence with regard to my representation of time, 
but precisely because of this, allows for my achieving and taking hold of it.58 
The disjointedness of messianic time thus indicates presence by marking our 
noncoincidence with it. 
This gap that operational time measures, beyond simply describing our 
noncoincidence with our image of time, further marks the noncoincidence of thought 
with language, the impossibility of an absolute sustained self-presence: “For in order 
to form the words in which thought is expressed—and in which a certain time-image 
is realized—thought would have to take recourse to an operational time, which 
cannot be represented in the representation in which it is still implicated.”59 Agamben 
makes this observation in the context of Benveniste’s indicators of enunciation, words 
including pronouns and demonstratives that, apart from any sentiment they are 
deployed to convey, express solely the instance of discourse.60 This is the very concept 
57 Agamben, Time That Remains, p. 66. 
58 Agamben, Time That Remains, p. 67. 
59 Agamben, Time That Remains, pp. 66-67. Agamben’s argument here is thus something of a departure 
from that of the 1978 essay ‘Time and History: A Critique of the Instant and the Continuum’, in which 
he attempts to formulate a “cairology” based on pleasure that moves beyond the conception of time as 
split between eternity and chronological time articulated in the discrete and elusive instant, “which 
dooms any attempt to master time.” See Agamben, Infancy and History, pp. 114-115.  
60 Émile Benveniste, ‘The Nature of Pronouns’, in Problems in General Linguistics, trans. Mary Elizabeth 
Meek, Miami, University of Miami Press, 1971, p. 218. See also ‘Subjectivity in Language’ in the same 
volume, pp. 223-230. Agamben elaborates at length upon this concept in Language and Death; see 
Agamben, Language and Death, pp. 23-24. Of note, in Language and Death, Agamben cites the indicators of 
the utterance to support his critique of the Voice with which they are analogous, whereas in his later work 
they are deployed to counter language’s claim of articulation. 
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that Agamben looks to in Remnants of Auschwitz to establish his model of subjectivity, a 
paradoxical condition that simultaneously implies both a subjectification and a 
desubjectification affected by the self-referentiality of language.61 
Neither a supplementary nor separate temporality, as internal to chronological 
time, messianic time does not replace it, but is rather the transformative force within 
it. Rather than a binding action or articulation, the structure of messianic time as the 
measure of the disconnection of oneself from one’s image of time, is much like that of 
testimony. The space that messianic time opens between ourselves and our 
representation of time, therefore, permits us access to this transformative force at 
every instant. As Agamben insists, “The plēroma of kairoi is understood as the relation 
of each instant to the Messiah—each kairos is [immediate to God], and is not just the 
final result of a process . . . .”62 What we take hold of in messianic time is not 
messianic time itself, but chronological time, and the transformative force that 
messianic time occasions is thus how we might take hold of chronological time. 
Critically, however, while messianic time is absolutely immanent, this immanence is 
qualified by ephemerality. It is absolutely fugitive, incessantly reconstituting itself and 
ever evasive. 
In conclusion, while Chiesa’s penetrative critique sheds light on the complexity of 
the multi-faceted figure of bare life and calls attention to the Christian tendency in his 
messianic politics, this immanent construction of messianic time is not sufficiently 
prominent in his analysis of the evental aspect of Agamben’s philosophy. Chiesa is 
correct to recognize that Agamben’s attempt to conceptualise messianic time in such a 
way to defy sequentiality is a failure; but, this is not because it falls back on a single 
transformational messianic event. In terms of Chiesa’s argument, there is a will to 
language shared by the Voice and bare life in the figure of the Muselmann, but this will 
functions, beyond its transformative power, as an enunciative and not just evental 
linguistic temporality. 
In this sense, Agamben’s critique of deconstruction discloses an enunciative or, 
rather, a temporal-linguistic ontology that is derived from the profound influence of 
Émile Benveniste upon his thought by way of the fugitive temporality of enunciation. 
From its appearance in Language and Death as indicating the nihilistic groundless 
ground of the Western metaphysical tradition, to its repurposing in Remnants of 
Auschwitz as the constitution of the fractured subject in testimony, to its casting as the 
transformative messianic presence in every instant in Time That Remains, the fugitive 
temporality of the enunciative act is a dominant fixture in Agamben’s philosophy. 
61 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, pp. 105-6, 112, 129. 
62 Agamben, Time That Remains, p. 76. 
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While it is without doubt that Agamben is “able to formulate a transvaluation of 
biopolitics only in the guise of a bio-theo-politics,” and indeed that this transvaluation 
is a form of vitalism,63 this transvaluation is not limited to a single messianic event, 
but, rather, is diffused into the linguistic act itself. 
This normatization of messianic time into chronological time through its uniform 
fragmentation into every instant has grave consequences for Agamben’s professed 
fidelity to Walter Benjamin. The final words of his Theses on the Philosophy of History 
attest to this. Speaking of the relationship to the past shared by the Jews who were 
prohibited from investigating the future, Benjamin writes, “For every second of time 
was the strait gate through which the Messiah might enter [Denn in ihr war jede Sekunde 
die kleine Pforte, durch die der Messias treten konnte].”64 By contrast, Agamben appropriates 
this sentiment as such: “The Messiah has always already arrived, he is always already 
there. Each moment, each image is charged with history because it is the door 
through which the Messiah enters.”65 Nullifying the possibility for the authentic 
dialectical seizing hold of the historical image when it flashes up, “where thinking 
suddenly stops in a configuration pregnant with tensions,”66 Agamben’s inscription of 
messianic presence into every instant transforms Benjamin’s Jetztzeit into precisely the 
“homogenous, empty time” that he rails against. In this sense one may say that in 
Agamben’s own political theology the exception has become the rule. 
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